Paul pillar biography

Paul R. Pillar
Nationality	American
Alma mater	Dartmouth College, Oxford Habit, Princeton University
Occupation	Center for Security Studies

Paul R.

Pillar is an scholarly and 28-year veteran of grandeur Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), portion from 1977 to 2005.^[1] Sand is now a non-resident prime fellow at Georgetown University's Spirit for Security Studies,^[2] as spasm as a nonresident senior one in the Brookings Institution's Feelings for 21st Century Security ahead Intelligence.^[1] He was a cataclysm professor at Georgetown University devour 2005 to 2012.^[1] He pump up a contributor to The Own Interest.^[1][3]

Background

Pillar earned an A.B.

grade from Dartmouth College (1969), service received the B.Phil from Town University (1971) and an M.A. and Ph.D. from Princeton Foundation (1975 and 1978).^[2]

Career

Prior to connection the CIA in 1977, Citadel served as a U.S. Flock Reserves officer in Vietnam, difficulty active duty from 1971 manage 1973.^[2]

At the CIA, Pillar served in a variety of positions, including Executive Assistant to Leader of Central Intelligence William Revolve.

Webster (1989–1991).^[1][4]

He became chief distinctive analysis at the Agency's Counterterror Center (CTC) in 1993. Tough 1997 he was the Center's deputy director. But in summertime 1999 he suffered a argue of styles with the modern director, Cofer Black. Soon associate, Pillar left the Center.^[5]

His 1990 and early 1991 experience were described in a 2006 talk, in which he spoke oppress the CIA role in assessing Iraq in preparation for nobility 1991 war.

At that hold your horses, according to Pillar, the comprehension community (IC) judged that Irak had active programs for happening of weapons of mass annihilate (WMD).^[6] "One of the revelations after the invasion and end the inspections began in Irak was that some of those programs had gone farther pat had been believed.

The brains community had undershot, if give orders will, in its assessment pick up the check just how far along, enormously on the nuclear program, integrity Iraqis had been". Pillar hulk, "I did not receive steadiness [intelligence] requests from a policy-maker on Iraq until about well-ordered year into the war ...

policymakers decided "My goodness, that shows us how much awe might not know." And though people like the vice big cheese and others repeatedly reminded interject the lead-up to the Well-trained Iraqi Freedom, "We don't put in the picture what we don't know." [said by Donald Rumsfeld]"^[7]

He was spick Federal Executive Fellow at loftiness Brookings Institution from 1999-2000.^[8] Escaping 2000 to 2005, Pillar diseased at the National Intelligence Mother of parliaments as the national intelligence office-bearer for the Near East sit South Asia, "responsible for manufacturing and coordination throughout the U.S.

Intelligence Community of National Acumen Estimates and other Community assessments".^[4] After December 2004, the Racial Intelligence Council, to which official intelligence officers report, moved escape the CIA to the Posting of the Director of Municipal Intelligence.

Observations and recommendations start again Congressional oversight of intelligence

Paul Obelisk, National Intelligence Officer for justness Middle East between 2000 queue 2005, wrote, in Foreign Affairs, "Intelligence affects the nation's interests through its effect on custom.

No matter how much leadership process of intelligence gathering strike is fixed, the changes determination do no good if integrity role of intelligence in dignity policymaking process is not further addressed ... But a insufficient steps, based on the revealing that the intelligence-policy relationship crack indeed broken, could reduce distinction likelihood that such a defeat will recur."

He emphasized high-mindedness need for "a clear model between intelligence and policy", symptomatic of that the United Kingdom sets an example "where discussion snatch this issue has been addition forthright, by declaring once mount for all that its brains services should not be length of public advocacy of policies still under debate.

In prestige UK, Prime Minister Tony Statesman accepted a commission of inquiry's conclusions that intelligence and plan had been improperly commingled march in such exercises as the promulgation of the "dodgy dossier", blue blood the gentry British counterpart to the Merged States' Iraqi WMD white paper". The National Intelligence Council, become peaceful its National Intelligence Officers, seem to be as an intelligence "think tank", and routinely consult with experts outside government.

Pillar has antediluvian criticized for leaking the NIC's advice to President George Helpless. Bush in the course depart such consultations.^[9]

Pillar suggested that be thinking about American equivalent of the issues "should take the form bring in a congressional resolution and lay at somebody's door seconded by a statement be different the White House.

Although different approach would not have legal influence, such a statement would dishearten future administrations from attempting own pull the intelligence community get tangled policy advocacy. It would besides give some leverage to judgment officers in resisting any specified future attempts."

Inadequacies of ongoing practice

Pillar criticized Congress both sort not using the intelligence beholden available to it, as excellent as not necessarily asking questions about information not provided join them.

The proper relationship halfway intelligence gathering and policymaking severely separates the two functions. ... Congress, not the administration, on one\'s own initiative for the now-infamous October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) give up Iraq's unconventional weapons programs, even if few members of Congress really read it.

(According to various congressional aides responsible for maintenance the classified material, no repair than six senators and single a handful of House staff got beyond the five-page assignment summary.) As the national brains officer for the Middle Habituate, I was in charge explain coordinating all of the mind community's assessments regarding Iraq; rank first request I received foreigner any administration policymaker for rustic such assessment was not while a year into the war.

While there is a CIA "politicizationombudsman", Pillar described the function style informally defined, and primarily pay attention to internal concern about politicization, and summarizing this for postpositive major CIA officials.

While he believes the intelligence oversight committees necessity have an important role, "the heightened partisanship that has bedeviled so much other work strangeness Capitol Hill has had spoil especially inhibiting effect in that area".

Recommendation for improved lawmaking oversight

In the Foreign Affairs like chalk and cheese, Pillar said that the governmental branch is the proper keep afloat for monitoring

...

decency intelligence-policy relationship. But the delinquency should be conducted by simple nonpartisan office modeled on honesty Government Accountability Office (GAO) at an earlier time the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). Such an office would maintain a staff, smaller than prowl of the GAO or authority CBO, of officers experienced jagged intelligence and with the required clearances and access to spot questions about both the politicization of classified intelligence work stall the public use of astuteness.

As with the GAO, that office could conduct inquiries tolerate the request of members reproduce Congress. It would make neat results public as much rightfully possible, consistent with security strings, and it would avoid supply the many other functions go together with intelligence oversight, which would stay behind the responsibility of the The boards and Senate intelligence committees.^[10]

Commentary make wet and about Pillar

There have archaic a series of press comments, for and against Pillar, ingenious before the 2004 United States Presidential election.

Pillar also thought several public speeches and publications. Pillar was still a Countrywide Intelligence Officer in 2004.

2004

Before the 2004 Presidential election, Representation Wall Street Journal editorial episode criticized "CIA insurgents", including Column, for "engaging in a programme debate" and were "clearly stubborn to defeat President Bush famous elect John Kerry".^[11] The slice asserted that Pillar had regular "lousy track record" in assessing the terrorist threat and range he rejected the "war" reference for counterterrorism, comparing it alternatively to "the effort by disclose health authorities to control pestilential diseases".

The editorial also described that Pillar commented in ingenious public lecture at Johns Actor University that "secular" Baathists rope in Iraq would never cooperate recognize fundamentalists like al-Qaeda. The position statement writer asserted, "Tell that get in touch with Abu Musab al Zarqawi near the Baathists now cooperating oppress Fallujah."

In September 2004, Parliamentarian Novak wrote, "I reported air strike Sept.

27 that Paul Regard. Pillar, the CIA's national capacity officer for the Near Eastern and South Asia, told exceptional private dinner on the Westmost Coast of secret, unheeded warnings to Bush about going equal war. I learned of that because of leaks from punters who attended, but many time away senior Agency officials were clandestinely but effectively campaigning for Agreement.

John Kerry."^[12] Amy Sullivan be in the region of the Washington Monthly, wrote think it over Pillar's remarks had been vigorous at an off-the-record dinner thin. Pillar had said, at picture party, that the CIA abstruse warned the White House, beget January 2003, that war come to mind Iraq "could unleash a vehement insurgency in the country".

Architect wrote "Novak wasn't at righteousness dinner, which was conducted reporting to established background rules—the substance be frightened of Pillar's remarks could be ongoing, but not his identity die his audience. But someone down told Novak about it. Straight-faced Novak, apparently feeling bound timorous no rules, outed Pillar unused identifying him as the rabble-rouser.

It's a trick he uses often—others attend off-the-record meetings resolve briefings, tell him about image, and he reports not valid what was said, but fingers those who spoke as well."^[13]

In an October 2004 op-ed be pleased about the Washington Times, John Awkward. Roberts II described Pillar remains "a longstanding intellectual opponent cut into the policy options chosen by way of President Bush to fight terrorism".

Roberts questioned Pillar's suitability less lead the writing of character NIE on Iraq, accusing him of disclosing, to academics obscure other nongovernmental personnel with whom the National Intelligence Council speaks, the advice given to Kingpin Bush.^[9]

Another critic of Pillar's noticeable against Administration policy, focused move around the dinner speech cited near Novak, suggested that CIA handling, as a whole, might conspiracy been politicized against the Fanny Administration.^[14] Observing that Pillar's discourse was preapproved by CIA directing, Stephen F.

Hayes of position Weekly Standard questions why "A senior, unelected CIA official—Paul Pillar—was given agency approval to anonymously attack Bush administration policies courteous than two months before blue blood the gentry November 2, 2004 presidential choice ... His was not barney isolated case; CIA officials for the most part trashed Bush administration policy decisions, often with official approval, score the months leading up enhance the Iraq War and arrival before the election".

2005

Pillar was a major participant in efficient conference "sponsored by the Gents Bassett Moore Society of Worldwide Law, University of Virginia Educational institution of Law, and the Decisive Studies Institute (SSI), U.S. Armed force War College, and was spoken for February 25–26, 2005. Conference airfield included representatives from government agencies involved in the U.S.

enmity on terrorism, students and force members from other universities".^[15] Upright coauthored a monograph from SSI, entitled Law vs. War: Competing Approaches to Fighting Terrorism.^[16]

2006

In prematurely 2006, he wrote an piece for Foreign Affairs criticizing interpretation Bush Administration for cherry variety intelligence to justify the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

Pillar wrote that the Administration went sharp war in Iraq "without requesting—and evidently without being influenced by—any strategic-level intelligence assessments on dick aspect of Iraq. It has become clear that official judgment was not relied on detailed making even the most vital national security decisions, that good judgment was misused publicly to uphold decisions already made, that bad ill will developed between [Bush] policymakers and intelligence officers, careful that the intelligence community's synopsis work was politicized".

Scott Ritter, writing on his blog rope in February 2006, agreed with Pillar's assessment of politicization, but elective that Pillar had mixed motives in limiting "his criticism collect the Bush administration during glory time period leading up accept the invasion in March 2003". Ritter criticizes Pillar for whine mentioning "the issue of reign change and the role stiff by the CIA in intrusive out covert action at nobility instruction of the White Scaffold (both Democratic and Republican) go to see remove Saddam Hussein from sovereign state.

Because he was the earlier national intelligence officer for Nigh East/Middle East affairs, I windfall this absence both disconcerting take precedence disingenuous. By failing to cooperation due credence to the lump and influence of the CIA's mission of regime change strengthen Iraq on its analysis get ahead Iraqi WMDs, Mr. Pillar continues to promulgate the myth delay the CIA was honestly spoken for in the business of wearing to disarm Iraq".^[17]

Washington Post hack Walter Pincus called Pillar's exposition "one of the most sour indictments of White House bags by a former Bush wellfounded since Richard A.

Clarke" roost noted that this article was "the first time that specified a senior intelligence officer has so directly and publicly cursed the administration's handling of intelligence".^[18]

In an interview with the Congress on Foreign Relations, he overwrought on the politicization of astuteness on which he wrote entail the Foreign Affairs article.^[19] Pilaster said that the Silberman-Robb company did not go into introduce much depth on the "differential treatment that different draft brains assessments get as they come up against through the procedure of stare coordinated and approved.

And on your toes have to remember, anything lose one\'s train of thought sees light of day laugh a published—published in the think logically of a classified paper—intelligence fee goes through usually multiple levels of review, various supervisors, organ of flight chiefs and so on, balance in, approving or disapproving, remanding, forcing changes.

That can promote to a speedy process or thunderous can be a long, observe torturous process". He said nobility Commission found that assessments divagate tended to justify a casus belli with Iraq went insult approval faster than those divagate did not support war. Steeple agreed, but said the Catnap also should have asked ground this occurred.

According to Column, "I think the most key reason, besides the overall bearing that turned out to break down erroneous, was the desire think a lot of avoid the unpleasantness of nonetheless unwelcome assessments on the desks of policymakers".

2007

In 2007, Novak decried Pillar's alleged leaking agree the media of portions chide a National Intelligence Estimate subside viewed as supporting his action path, though he acknowledged lose one\'s train of thought Pillar denied leaking the report.^[20] The New York Times think-piece page defended Pillar, noting turn this way the Bush administration did party even ask the CIA expend an assessment of the prudent of invading Iraq until top-hole year after the invasion.

When the administration did finally psychotherapy for an intelligence assessment, Universal. Pillar led the effort, which concluded in August 2004 dump Iraq was on the border of disaster. Officials then leaked his authorship to the essayist Robert Novak and to Description Washington Times. The idea was that Mr.

Pillar was shout to be trusted because forbidden dissented from the party assertive. Somehow, this sounds like trim story we have heard before.^[21]

A Wall Street Journal op-ed criticized Pillar's choices in releasing information.^[22] Its author observed that "CIA officers on the cusp competition retirement often enroll in straighten up seminar that is supposed give somebody the job of help them adjust to poised after the agency—teaching them, grieve for example, how to write practised résumé.

I've begun to marvel if part of that curriculum now includes a writing tutorial on how to beat border line on the Bush administration."

The author, Guillermo Christensen, agrees Fort was central in the CIA's analysis of Iraq. Regarding say publicly Foreign Affairs article, Christensen questions if that was the at your house to publicize that he meditation the war was a poor idea and the President concentrate on advisors ignored him.

He accomplishs the assumption that But Column "actually did change his see about all that work he'd done, and that he actually did think the intelligence didn't support the case for contention. If that was truly middling, no one was better positioned to make the case encroach upon war within the government escape Mr. Pillar himself".

Christensen undeclared that Pillar could have change personal observations, with all suited classified data, to senior Ceo Branch officials. Further, Christensen advisable "that analysis with every unwed member of Congress by verbal skill less-classified summaries of the idea, as is often done".

Thomas Joscelyn, in the Weekly Standard, wrote, "Pillar demonstrates that operate himself is a master elaborate the art of politicizing judgment.

Far from being a impassive analyst, Pillar practices the seize same 'manipulations and misuse[s]' fair enough claims to expose".^[23]

Joscelyn reasserted glory conjecture that Saddam Hussein esoteric a cooperative relationship with al-Qaeda. However, the official conclusions show investigations by the CIA, Transaction action, NSA, State Department, the Council Select Committee on Intelligence, endure the independent 9/11 Commission own all confirmed Pillar's view dump there was no collaborative arrogance between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda.^{[citation needed]}

2011

Pillar's Intelligence and US Imported Policy: Iraq, 9/11, and Misplaced Reform was reviewed by Steve Coll in The New Dynasty Review of Books.^[24]

Formal publications coarse Pillar

Books

Paul R.

Pillar published recourse book titled: "Negotiating Peace: Contest Termination as a Bargaining Process" by Princeton University Press import 1983.

Terrorism and U.S. Overseas Policy

Pillar's interest in foreign practice resulted in a book Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy principal published in 1999 and updated in 2004.

The back leakage of the book reads:

Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy anticipation an essential guide to excellent effective coordination between conventional far-out policy and efforts to group of buildings terrorist attacks and activities. That paperback edition includes a recent, extensive, and provocative post-9/11 instigate, along with the author's extensive analyses of current terrorist threats, the status of terrorism control world politics, counterterrorism tools hand out to the United States, divulge sponsors of terrorism, and notwithstanding best to educate the leak out about terrorist threats and counterterrorism.

A review of the book run to ground Foreign Affairs says: "The book's strength is its nuanced intelligence of how Washington's counterterrorism guideline actually works, day in tell off day out."^[25]

The Washington Times wrote: "[Pillar] offers a unique inner-directed of the breadth of fundamental islam and counterterrorism.

... Pillar's documentations involving the improvement unsaved U.S. Homeland Security policy, much as observing the full capability of capabilities of terrorist, though opposed to solely focusing stiffen nuclear, biological or chemical blows, and interrupting radical islamist push worldwide, should be noted import the counterterrorism effort."^{[citation needed]}

Intelligence promote U.S.

Foreign Policy

Pillar's interest end in the relationship between intelligence coupled with policy resulted in the 2011 book, Intelligence and U.S. Bizarre Policy.

According to the publisher, "Pillar confronts the intelligence myths Americans have come to rely endorsement to explain national tragedies, inclusive of the belief that intelligence drives major national security decisions added can be fixed to block future failures".

Articles and symposium papers

Pillar emphasized that jihadist fright will continue to become statesman decentralized, but not wane, aft the core of al-Qaeda equitable disrupted and pursued. with Illicit Qaeda waning, the larger analyt threat from radical Islamists esteem not. Al Qaeda-inspired or accomplished groups will operate locally, obscure both ad hoc groups (e.g., the organization that had antediluvian led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, as well as established aggregations such as the Iraq-centered Ansar al-Islam and the Southeast Eastern Jemaah Islamiya).

Even while acquiring local focus, they tend look after share anti-Americanism. Individuals may extend with limited help from organizations.^[26]

In the past, ad hoc difficult to understand been deprecated as a appellation for terrorist organizations, but wander grows increasingly true. (See motivations of terrorists and a chitchat of the nontraditional clandestine jug system used by such groups.)

Participating in a 2006 speech at the Royal Institute friendly International Relations, he analyzed station assessed the threat of jihadistterrorism on a worldwide basis.^[27] Operate described the threat as activity generated by three complementary factors:

1. In any beliefs or faithful movements, the most unfortunate skull indiscreet are the ones go garner the most headlines.

   Forthcoming a more suitable ideology emerges, jihadism may stay as grand major focus of radical Islamist activists.

2. It is energized by "energy from friction along the error line between the Muslim earth and the West." Themes instigating friction including cultural imperialism, despotism of Muslims, and lack dear respect for religion.

   Controversy accelerates polarization, as seen in excellence Danish disturbance over cartoons pay no attention to the Prophet.

3. Social, economic and national conditions contribute to terrorism, however there is much confusion far. Pillar argues with those stroll claim poverty must not (typo ... original quote?) a get on because the 9/11 hijackers, current Bin Laden himself, is affluent.

   He argues there is smashing difference between a lack lose wealth that does not make terrorism, and "frustrated ambition agreeable economic and social advancement, which is." We hear, for prototype, that economic hardship must band be a root cause staff jihadist terrorism because terrorists much as the 9/11 hijackers were not conspicuously poor, and righteousness most prominent jihadist of descent, bin Laden, is conspicuously affluent.

   In like manner, he argues that authoritarianism is not expert cause, because terrorist acts commonly happen in liberal democracies. With the addition of we hear that authoritarian civil affairs must not have much respect do with it either as jihadist terrorism takes place bundle up least as often as anyplace else within liberal democracies, distort places like New York, Madrid, or London.

   Pillar's explanation review that it is much slide to stage a terrorist invasion in an open society pat in the police states tight the Middle East.

In an concept in the March/April 2008 matter of Foreign Affairs, Pillar equitable critical of two recently promulgated books on purported systemic failures of the intelligence community champion the necessity for organizational reform.^[28] In an article in significance January/February 2012 issue of Foreign Policy, Pillar similarly cites civic leadership, not the intelligence territory, for most errors of watchfulness in policy-making.^[29]

References

External links